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Abstract. We study a model which explains an politically determined
pollution tax outcome under asymmetric duopoly. We assume an asym-
metry of ¯rms in the pollution emissions per unit of output. The pol-
luting duopoly and three-stage political game are considered. We derive
the equilibrium tax rate and show that it might excess the marginal ex-
ternal damages, even without an environmental group. The politically
determined tax rate is decomposed to the marginal external damages,
the imperfect competition e®ect, and the lobbying e®ect. Under linear
demand and cost functions, we derive the condition that Pigouvian tax-
ation is politically determined. The e®ect on the equilibrium tax of ¯rm
heterogeneity is discussed.
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11 Introduction
It is well known that environmental policy is a®ected by special in-
terest groups in political process. This paper investigates an politically
determined pollution tax in an oligopolistic context. The importance of
this analysis is that oligopolistic ¯rms form a lobby group and in°uence
environmental policy making and that there is strategic interactions in
political and product stages.
Our analysis is part of a growing literature on a political economy ap-
proach to environmental policy. It emphasizes in°uence of interest groups
on government policy choices. The e®ects of lobbying on environmental
policy are usually examined by the common-agency model (Grossman and
Helpman 1994) in which self-interested government maximizes a weighted
sum of social welfare and contributions from lobby groups. The political
contributions considered are contingent on a pollution tax policy. There
have been many investigations of environmental policy choice and lobby-
ing e®ects. (see Aidt 1998, Aidt and Dutta 2004, Fredriksson 1997,1999,
Fredriksson and Svensson 2003). Most studies assume perfect competi-
tion. Exceptionally, a few papers assume imperfect competition. Da-
mania(1999) and Damania and Fredriksson (2000) consider pollution tax
on oligopolistic ¯rms 1. But, the former focuses on political lobbying on
the choice of environmental policy instruments (a emission standard or
an emission taxes), and the later focuses on lobby group formation in an
1Dijkstra(2004) elaborates and modi¯es the model of Damania(1999).
2in¯nitely repeated game. Hence, their central concerns are not the equi-
librium tax rate itself in imperfect competition. Not much attention has
been paid to to the properties of the politically determined pollution tax
under oligopoly, especially under heterogeneous case. The importance
of the exploring of environmental policy under heterogeneous oligopoly
relates to the problem that the government have to meet the abatement
commitments agreed to in the international environmental agreement,
such as the Kyoto global warming treaty.
We study a model which explains an politically determined pollution
tax outcome under an asymmetric duopoly. This paper extends the ex-
isting literature by incorporating endogenous environmental policy model
and pollution taxation under oligopoly (Simpson 1995). Because abate-
ment technologies actually di®er among ¯rms within the same industry,
we allow ¯rm heterogeneity in the model. Heterogeneity a®ects not only
product amounts in output market but also lobbying activities in polit-
ical process. This means that oligopolists generate not only imperfect
competition distortion but also political distortion. We derive the equi-
librium tax rate and show that it may excess the marginal environmental
damages, even without an environmental lobby group. Assuming lin-
ear demand and cost functions, we derive the condition that politically
determined tax equals the marginal external damages (Pigouvian tax).
In this paper, we consider the following three-stage game. In the ¯rst
stage, both ¯rms simultaneously and independently o®er the government
contribution schedules. In the second stage, the government chooses a
3tax policy which maximizes the government utility taking the contribu-
tion schedules as given. In the third stage, the two ¯rms compete µ a la
Cournot in the output market, taking the tax as given.
When we treat lobbying by heterogeneous ¯rms, it is necessary to con-
sider the problems how to decide whether each ¯rm participates in a lobby
group and how the lobby group including heterogeneous members makes
decisions. Consider the following two ¯rms: one ¯rm uses a clean tech-
nology and another ¯rm uses a dirty. They di®er in pollution emissions
per unit of output. If the di®erence of cleanliness between these ¯rms is
small, the di®erence of attitudes about stringency of environmental reg-
ulation will be also small. But, if the di®erence of cleanliness is large,
the di®erence of attitudes will be also large. Whereas the dirtier ¯rm
never prefer stringent environmental policy, the cleaner ¯rm may prefer
it because it will increase its share of the market. Then, if we suppose
that two ¯rms always participate in the same lobby group, they can not
make decision-making in the latter case. Avoiding these di±culties, we
assume that each ¯rm independently o®ers the government contribution
as in Damania and Fredriksson(2000). If two ¯rms have the same direc-
tion of the contribution schedules in the equilibrium, we consider that
they form a lobby group. On the other hand, if they have the opposite
directions, we regard one ¯rm as one lobby group. This approach is useful
when ¯rm heterogeneity is allowed. Moreover, it alleviates the traditional
free rider problem (Olson 1965), because political contributions of each
¯rm are considered to be sort of private contributions of public goods.
4The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, and
Section 3 derives the political equilibrium pollution tax. Section 4 investi-
gates property of the equilibrium under linear cost and demand function.
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Consider an economy with two sectors: duopoly by producing a ho-
mogenous good Q with pollution, and a competitive sector by producing
a numeraire good z without pollution 2. The economy has N identical
consumers. N is normalized to one. The consumers derive disutility from
total pollution emissions e and utility from consumption of good z and
Q. A representative consumer has utility given by:
U = z + u(Q) ¡ PQ ¡ D(e) (1)
where z is consumption of the numeraire good, Q is output of the duopoly,
P is the price of good Q, and D(e) is pollution damage where D0 > 0
and D00 > 0 . We assume that u0 > 0 and u00 < 0. There are no income
e®ects, and thus we can perform partial equilibrium analysis.
Let qi denote ¯rm i's output. Each of two Cournot duopolists, ¯rm
1 and 2, has same cost function c(qi);c0 > 0;c00 ¸ 0. For simplicity, we
restrict our attention to di®erence of pollution emissions, we assume that
the only di®erence across ¯rms is on emissions per unit of output. Firm i's
2For simplicity, we analysis duopoly case in the model. However, the results in this
section can generalize to n(n ¸ 3) ¯rms case.
5pollution emissions is ei = µiqi, where µi is the ¯rm-speci¯c constant and
we assume that µ1 · µ2. If the strict inequality µ1 < µ2 holds, it implies
that ¯rm 2 is dirtier than ¯rm 1. Firms cannot reduce their emissions
without reducing outputs.
From the utility function (1), we get the inverse demand function P(Q),
which satis¯es
P
0(Q) < 0: (2)
For stability of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, we assume
P
0(Q) + P
00(Q)qi < 0: (3)
The pro¯t function for ¯rm i is :
¼
i(q1;q2;t) = P(Q)qi ¡ c(qi) ¡ tµiqi (4)
where Q = q1 + q2, and t is a pollution tax per unit of emissions. Given




0(qi) ¡ tµi = 0: (5)
We assume the following two assumptions on ¯rms. Firstly, we identify
a ¯rm with owners of the ¯rm's speci¯c factor. This is true as far as
the owners of the speci¯c factor represent a negligible fraction of the
population. Secondly, we assume that each ¯rm i separately chooses its








P(Q)dQ ¡ c(q1) ¡ c(q2) ¡ D(e); (7)
where e = e1 + e2
3. For future reference, we de¯ne the optimal second-
best pollution tax rate t¤ which maximizes (7). Di®erentiating (7) with















As already pointed by Simpson(1995), the second-best pollution tax rate
is not equal to the marginal external damages because of imperfect com-





dt < 0 4.
3 The Political Equilibrium
An environmental tax policy is modeled as a three-stage game between
the government and the ¯rms. In the ¯rst stage, both ¯rms simulta-
neously and independently o®er the government contribution schedules,
(s1(t);s2(t)), as nonnegative di®erentiable functions of t, taking the other
¯rm's contribution schedule as given. In the second stage, the govern-
ment chooses a tax policy; t maximizes the government utility, taking
the contribution schedules as given. In the third stage, the two ¯rms
3We do not discriminate each pollution.
4This is always not the case, because the emissions can be increasing in the tax.
7compete µ a la Cournot in the output market ,taking the tax as given 5.
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), the government assumed to be
self-interested and maximizes a weighted sum of political contributions
and social welfare. The government's utility function is given by:





where ® is the given weight on social welfare relative to contributions.
Contributions are used by the incumbent politicians to ¯nance the elec-
tion campaign.
Next we consider an equilibrium conditions. Following Lemma 2 of
Bernheim and Whinston (1986), the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
(to;fsio(t)gi2f1;2g) is characterized by the two necessary conditions,
(Condition 1) t













Condition 1 states that the government sets a tax policy to maximize
its payo®, given the contribution schedules. Condition 2 states that the
government sets a tax policy to maximize the joint payo® of ¯rm j and
the government, given the contribution schedule o®ered by the other ¯rm.
If this condition were not satis¯ed, ¯rm j could modify its contribution
schedule to induce the government to choose the jointly optimal policy
and capture nearly all the surplus from the change.
5We ruled out that two ¯rms cooperatively act as a monopoly ¯rm. Because we
focus on di®erence of pollution abatement technology in same industry and cartels are
prohibited by antitrust laws in most countries.








Eq.(10) implies that contribution schedules are locally truthful around the
equilibrium tax rate, that is, the marginal change in the ¯rm's contribu-
tion for a small change in tax policy equals the marginal change in its










From (5) and (11), we obtain the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1 The politically determined environmental tax rate
























The above result is explained as follows. The ¯rst term on the right-
hand side of (12) denotes the marginal external damages. The second
term denotes the imperfect competition e®ect, which is the di®erence be-
tween the second best pollution tax rate under oligopoly (8) and the
Pigouvian tax rate. This re°ects a correction due to the underproduction
resulting from imperfect competition. The third term denotes the lobby-
ing e®ect, which represents political pressures from ¯rms. The numerator
of this term is the sum of the marginal change in each ¯rm's pro¯t re-
duction for a small change in tax policy. Its sign is undetermined. Then,
9while the sign of the denominator of this term is negative, the sign of the
third term is ambiguous. Hence, according to the di®erence of cleanliness,
pressures from lobby groups may reinforce each other or may o®set each
other.
Let us ¯rst state a straightforward corollary.
Corollary 1 If the sum of the imperfect competition e®ect and the
lobbying e®ect in the equilibrium equals zero, then Pigouvian tax will be
realized in the political equilibrium.














Because the sign of dqi=dt and d¼i=dt are negative in symmetric case
6. The second and third terms on the right-hand side of (13) is always
negative respectively. In symmetric case, ¯rms' lobbying pressures always
reinforce each other. In this case, it appears that two ¯rms form one lobby
group.
Corollary 2
If two ¯rms are symmetric, then the political equilibrium tax must be
less than the marginal external damages of pollution.
6See,Simpson(1995),p.362 and p.365.
10Let us consider the over-internalization case. Su±cient conditions for
inequality to > D0 to hold are that the numerators of the second and third
term of the right-hand side of (12) have positive signs. Di®erentiating (4)
with respect to t, we obtain:
d¼i
dt










where the term in square brackets in the right-hand side is zero from the
¯rst-order condition (5) of pro¯t maximization. From (12) and (14), the

















P 0 : (16)
According to the discussion of Simpson(1995), only ¯rm 1 can have posi-
tive sign of both dq1=dt , because in our model ¯rm 1 has a cost advantage
to ¯rm 2. Then, dq1=dt may be positive, while dq2=dt is always negative.
Accordingly, when dq1=dt and q1 is su±ciently large, we can expect that
to > D0 holds.
Last in this section, we note that the result that the politically deter-
mined tax may exceed the Pigouvian level is the oligopoly-speci¯c phe-
nomenon. First, consider perfect competition. By P 0 = 0, the imperfect
competition e®ect term in (12) is zero. Moreover the lobbying e®ect is
always negative because d¼i=dt = ¡tµi. Hence to < D0. Under perfect
competition, lobbying of ¯rms always tends to push the tax rate below the
11marginal external damages 7. Second, consider monopoly. It is easy to de-
rive that the tax rate under monopoly is to = D0+(P 0q=µ)+(µq=(®dq=dt)).
Hence also to < D0. Under monopoly, lobbying of a monopoly ¯rm also
does. Consequently, politically over-internalization may occur only under
oligopoly case.
4 The Equilibrium Tax and Firm Hetero-
geneity
In this section, we focus on the relationship between a pollution tax
policy and ¯rm heterogeneity. We seek the value of emission coe±cients
under which the equilibrium tax becomes the Pigouvian level, and exam-
ine the change in tax policy for a change in emission coe±cients.
In order to clear results, we introduce linear assumptions hereafter:
P(Q) = a¡bQ, c(qi) = cqi, and D0 = d . Under these assumptions, from
the standard derivation of Cournot duopoly, we now obtain
qi =
a ¡ c ¡ 2µit + µjt
3b
: (17)
Using (17), we can calculate (12) as follows.
t












In (18), the product of (b=2) and the last fraction term on the right-hand
side is the imperfect competition e®ect and the product of (b=®) and the
7Fredriksson(1997) considers a perfectly competitive ¯rms in a small open economy.
12last fraction term is the lobbying e®ect. The following proposition can
therefore be stated.
Proposition 2 Assume demand and cost functions are linear. The
imperfect competition e®ect and the lobbying e®ect have the same sign.
And the value of the lobbying e®ect is 2=® times as large as the imperfect
competition e®ect.
Without loss of generality, let µ1 be ¯xed. Output of ¯rm i can be
expressed as qi(t;µ2). Putting t = d, we solve for µ2 that satis¯es
q1(d;µ2)(2µ1 ¡ µ2) + q2(d;µ2)(2µ2 ¡ µ1) = 0: (19)





a ¡ c + 8µ1d +
q
(a ¡ c)2 + 36µ1d(a ¡ c ¡ µ1d)
¾
(20)
In the Appendix, we prove that ^ µ2 is a unique solution to the equation
(19) s.t. µ2 ¸ µ1. Under µ2 = ^ µ2, the imperfect competition e®ect and
the lobbying e®ect are vanished. Then the equilibrium tax become the
Pigouvian level.
Proposition 3 We assume demand and cost functions are linear. If
µ2 = ^ µ2, then the political equilibrium tax is equal to the marginal exter-
nal damages , to = D0.





1 ¡ µ1µ2 + µ2
2) ¡ (a ¡ c)(2 + ®)(µ1 + µ2)




We assume that the second-order condition of (9) is satis¯ed, the de-
nominator of (21) has positive sign. From (21), it is clear that the equi-
librium tax does not depend on the slope of the demand function 8.
With (21), it is straightforward to compute the e®ects of the equilib-
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By (22) and (23), the equilibrium tax is increasing in the marginal cost
and the marginal external damages 9.
A numerical example Last in this section, we consider the e®ect on
the equilibrium tax of ¯rm heterogeneity by a numerical example. Let
be a = 6;b = c = d = µ1 = 1, and ® = 3. When µ2 = ^ µ2 = 2:6, the
politically equilibrium tax coincides with the marginal external damages,
to = d = 1. Table I shows what occur when the value of the emission
coe±cient of ¯rm 2 is varied around ^ µ2.
From the viewpoint of the ¯rm 1, an increase in the tax rate causes its
own cost to increase, and its rival's cost to increase more than that. Since
8This property holds only linear demand function case.
9The derivation of dto=dµ2 is omitted because it is complex and its sign is ambigu-
ous.
14this raises the market share of ¯rm 1 in the ¯nal stage, ¯rm 1 bene¯ts
from an increase in the tax. If so, ¯rm 1 takes strategic action that favor
a higher pollution tax (ds1=dt = d¼1=dt > 0). On the other hand, from
the viewpoint of the ¯rm 2 , an increase in the tax rate always decreases
in its pro¯t. Since ¯rm 2 bene¯ts from a decrease in the pollution tax in
the ¯nal stage, ¯rm 2 favors a lower pollution tax . Hence, ¯rm 2 favors
a lower pollution tax (ds2=dt = d¼2=dt < 0) in the ¯rst stage.
Whether the equilibrium tax is larger or less than the marginal external
damages depends on di®erence in emissions per unit of output across two
¯rms. Implication of the three cases is as follows. In case (i), lobbying
e®ort by ¯rm 2 dominates that by ¯rm 1 (ds1=dt < jds2=dtj) , the equi-
librium tax is less than the marginal external damages. Case (ii) is the
critical state where ¯rm 1's contribution counterbalances with ¯rm 2's
that (ds1=dt = jds2=dtj). Because both ¯rm's lobbying e®ort cancel out
each other, Hence, the lobbing e®ect is vanished. From Proposition 2,
the imperfect competition e®ect is also vanished. The equilibrium tax is
exactly the marginal external damages. It implies that if ¯rm heterogene-
ity is a certain level, the social optimum is achieved. Note that this full
internalization realized without lobbying of an environmental organiza-
tion or other industries. In case (iii), lobbying e®ort by ¯rm 2 dominates
that of ¯rm 1 (ds1=dt > jds2=dtj) , the equilibrium tax is larger than the
marginal external damages.
155 Conclusions
This paper presents a model in which the pollution tax is determined
endogenously. The paper focuses on the politically determined pollution
tax under the asymmetric duopoly. The value of the equilibrium tax is
decomposed of the marginal external damage term, the imperfect com-
petition e®ect term, and the lobbying e®ect term. If the sum of the last
two terms are zero, the equilibrium tax coincides with Pigouvian tax.
This property is an oligopoly-speci¯c phenomenon. Under the linearity
of demand and cost functions, we solve the equilibrium tax rate which
is expressed as a function of the emissions per unit output and other
parameters. We derive the condition of the emission coe±cient that the
politically determined pollution tax is just the marginal external damages
where the political and imperfect competition distortion are vanished.
Implications of this paper is to analyze the role of strategic behaviors of
oligopolistic ¯rms. Each ¯rm has to choose not only output level but also
political contribution. The choice of political contributions in°uences a
pollution tax policy, and then the tax policy in°uences outputs and prof-
its of ¯rms. Another implication of this paper is to show a relationship
between ¯rm heterogeneity and the equilibrium tax. The numerical ex-
ample in the last section shows the following results. If ¯rm heterogeneity
is so large, the e®ort of the cleaner ¯rm dominates that of the dirtier ¯rm
and the equilibrium tax is larger than Pigouvian level. In this case, the
cleaner ¯rm may lead to adopt an environment-friendly policy like an
16environmental group in the political process, whereas an environmental
group does not appear in our model unlike many studies in the political
approach to environmental policy.
In future research, the model should be extended and improved in sev-
eral directions. The ¯rst extension is related to the asymmetric regulation
in imperfect markets. Recent studies about pollution tax on an asym-
metric oligopoly consider ¯rm-speci¯c taxes on pollution emissions. For
example, Long and Soubeyran (2005) advocate that optimal tax rates
per unit of emissions are not the same for heterogeneous oligopolists,i.e.,
an ine±cient ¯rm must incur a higher tax rate. However, if ¯rm-speci¯c
taxes are a®ected by lobbying activities of ¯rms, the theoretical result
should be modi¯ed. An ine±cient ¯rm may be successful in getting a
lower tax rate. Second extension incorporates environmental R&D to
alter emission coe±cients per unit of output. When cleanliness of each
¯rm is endogenized, each ¯rm reasonably spends R&D investment and
political contributions. This will make strategic interaction between ¯rms
more complex.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
We prove that ^ µ2 is a unique solution to the equation ¸(^ µ2) = 0 s.t.
µ2 ¸ µ1. Since the left hand side of (19) is a quadratic function of µ2, we





a ¡ c + 8µ1d +
q







a ¡ c + 8µ1d ¡
q
(a ¡ c)2 + 36µ1d(a ¡ c ¡ µ1d)
¾
:
But, a simple proof by contradiction shows that ~ µ2 does not satis¯ed the
assumption that µ2 ¸ µ1. (1=10d)(a¡c+8µ1d¡
q
(a ¡ c)2 + 36µ1d(a ¡ c ¡ µ1d)) ¸
µ1 () a ¡ c ¡ 2dµ1 ¸
q
(a ¡ c)2 + 36µ1d(a ¡ c ¡ µ1d) () (a ¡ c ¡
2dµ1)2 ¸ (a ¡ c)2 + 36µ1d(a ¡ c ¡ µ1d () ¡40dµ1(a ¡ c ¡ dµ1) ¸ 0:
But, from the assumptions that both ¯rms produce positive amounts,
q2 = (a ¡ c ¡ 2µ2d + µ1d)=3b > 0, and µ2 ¸ µ1, the sign of (a ¡ c ¡ dµ1)
must be positive. A contradiction occurs.
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